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Concepts and ﬁndings ‘translated’ from neuroscientiﬁc research are ﬁnding their way into UK health and
social policy discourse. Critical scholars have begun to analyse how policies tend to ‘misuse’ the neu-
rosciences and, further, how these discourses produce unwarranted and individualizing effects, rooted in
middle-class values and inducing guilt and anxiety. In this article, we extend such work while simul-
taneously departing from the normative assumptions implied in the concept of ‘misuse’. Through a
documentary analysis of UK policy reports focused on the early years, adolescence and older adults, we
examine how these employ neuroscientiﬁc concepts and consequently (re)deﬁne responsibility. In the
documents analysed, responsibility was produced in three different but intersecting ways: through a
focus on optimisation, self-governance, and vulnerability. Our work thereby adds to social scientiﬁc
examinations of neuroscience in society that show how neurobiological terms and concepts can be used
to construct and support a particular imaginary of citizenship and the role of the state. Neuroscience may
be leveraged by policy makers in ways that (potentially) reduce the target of their intervention to the
soma, but do so in order to expand the outcome of the intervention to include the enhancement of society
writ large. By attending as well to more critical engagements with neuroscience in policy documents, our
analysis demonstrates the importance of being mindful of the limits to the deployment of a neurobio-
logical idiom within policy settings. Accordingly, we contribute to increased empirical speciﬁcity con-
cerning the impacts and translation of neuroscientiﬁc knowledge in contemporary society whilst
refusing to take for granted the idea that the neurosciences necessarily have a dominant role (to play).
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Social policies, the consultation documents that undergird them,
and the speciﬁc (scientiﬁc) discourses employed within these can
provide valuable insights into how society and citizens are imagined
by the assemblages of actors constituting the state. The psychological
sciences especially have long been regarded as central to the gover-
nanceof post-War ‘Western’ societies and selves (Rose,1998). Nikolas
Rose in particular has argued how these have been part of a political
project within which citizens are governed through their freedoms:
they are obliged to take their fate into their own hands and tomake a
project out of their lives (Rose, 1998; Rose and Miller, 1992). More
recently, scholars have argued that the brain sciences are being
enrolled in the projects and logics of (self-)governance (Netherland,
2003; Pitts-Taylor, 2010; Rose, 2000; Thornton, 2011a; Vrecko,RFR, 23 Buccleuch Place, EH8
, martyn.pickersgill@ed.ac.uk
r Ltd. This is an open access article2010), making them an important topic for sociological analysis.
Various scholars have taken up this topic, including critics of the
use of the neurosciences in social and health policy e especially
that targeting the ‘early years’ (typically years 0e3, although this
varies among policy reports) (Featherstone et al., 2013; Macvarish
et al., 2014; Wastell and White, 2012). This scholarship describes
what the authors tend to term the ‘misuse’ of neuroscience, for
example when policy documents are regarded as drawing far-
reaching conclusions from neuroscientiﬁc research. It connects
with wider work on parenting and on the anxieties produced by
policies and cultural narratives in this area. Some scholars then
argue that an emphasis on the signiﬁcance of the developing brain
or a health discourse more generally makes parents (usually
mothers) feel anxious and guilty for not caring for their children in
exactly the ‘right’ way (Lee, 2008; Thornton, 2011a; Wall, 2004,
2010).
Other social scientists have eschewed the intrinsic normativity of
documenting the ‘misuse’ of neuroscience, taking a more descriptive
approach to examining how neuroscientiﬁc terms and concepts are
used, in which contexts, and to what ends. Such studies aroundunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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disorders and mental illness, for example, neuroscience is one of
several resources mobilised to articulate subjectivities (Br€oer and
Heerings, 2013; Pickersgill et al., in press; Singh, 2013). The brain
sciences, then, are at once evident in a number of realms whilst also
being sometimes ignored or resisted (Pickersgill, 2013). Narratives of
resistance or critique about neuroscience are evident even within
science journalism (Whiteley, 2012), which is commonly associated
with the propagation of more reductive tropes (Thornton, 2011b).
These studies therefore challenge any notion that recourse to a
neurobiological idiom necessarily entails an all-pervasive or reduc-
tionist ontology.
This paper takes cues from the aforementioned scholarship: it is
informed by (and situated within) STS (Science and Technology
Studies) literature concerned with the use of (neuro)science, whilst
also mindful of the criticisms raised by analysts more explicitly
attentive to what they perceive of as misuses of neurobiological
research. Our focus is on UK social policy documents that are ﬁxed
on the early years, adolescence, and later life. Accordingly, we
extend previous work that has predominantly focused on the ﬁrst
of these three life stages (Edwards et al., 2013; Macvarish et al.,
2013; Macvarish et al., 2014; Wastell and White, 2012). As exist-
ing scholarship notes, policy interest in the ‘developing brain’ is
considerable; yet, whilst adolescence and older adulthood are also
linked in different spheres to the brain (Choudhury et al., 2012;
Williams et al., 2012), the origins, incidences and effects of these
linkages have largely escaped sociological scrutiny.
Through our central concern with how neuroscience is used, we
relate our documentary analysis to the broader topic of responsibility,
considering how responsibility is (re)deﬁned and, relatedly, how so-
ciety is imagined in thepolicydocuments inspected.Responsibilitywas
a theme emerging from our analysis andwe pay close attention to the
way it is (re)deﬁned in thesepolicydocumentsand through theiruseof
theneurosciences.Weengagewith the thinkingofMichel Foucault and
more extensivelywith thatofNikolasRose and collaborators to analyse
how the neurosciences can be and are employed in order to stimulate
certain types of responsibilities for citizens. Our conceptualization of
responsibility evokes Foucault's treatment of power (Foucault, 1978);
we conceive of it as a discourse that ebbs and ﬂows, rather than as a
stable kind that moves linearly and uniformly from (e.g.) state to citi-
zenry, always existing to a ﬁnite and somehow quantiﬁable degree.
Following Rose and Miller (1992), we see the construction of re-
sponsibility as one means by which states can ‘govern at a distance’.
What thesescholars call “advanced liberaldemocracies” (p.174)govern
through the freedom and responsibilities of active citizens, with the
knowledge of experts central to this endeavour. The neurosciences,
then, represent one kind of expertise employed in responsibilising
citizens. Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) note, for instance, that the neu-
rosciences enjoin people to be responsible for keeping their brains
healthy in order to prevent social ills. This speaks to Rose's (2007)
notion of ‘biological citizenship’, aimed at capturing the inﬂuence of
biology on how citizens come to understand themselves and live their
lives, inways that can be bothe and simultaneouslye individualising
and collectivising. Whilst Rose's oeuvre is perhaps most associated
with the analysis of governance “beyond the state” (Rose and Miller,
1992), the way that citizens and society writ large are imagined
within policy documents produced by and for the state remains a key
point of interest for social scientists. Such texts, we suggest, therefore
constitute a relevant site for the investigation of how (and, indeed, if)
the neurosciences are leveraged to govern at a distance.
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold: (1) we interrogate a
larger body of policy documents than prior scholarship, in particular
by extending our analysis to policies concerned with adolescence
and older-adulthood; (2) our analysis is animated less by a impetus
to critique policy, but more by a desire to understand how (neuro)science is used in a variety of domains, including policy (hence, our
engagementswith social theorists like Foucault and Rose are distinct,
and therefore so too are our interpretations and conclusions e
especially our attention to the diverse, and sometimes highly rela-
tional, forms of responsibilisation that take place through policy
documents); and (3) we evidence how the neurosciences e and the
policies they are sometimes leveraged to support e can be critiqued
even by assemblages of policy actors themselves.
In what follows, we outline our methodology before presenting
the results in terms of three (overlapping) discursive themes relating
to responsibility: optimisation, self-governance, and vulnerability.
Weevidence theirenactment throughaneurobiological register inUK
policy documents, and in the conclusion reﬂect on the implications of
these ﬁndings for broader scholarship on neuroscience and society.
2. Methods
To examine how the neurosciences are being translated into pol-
icies aimed at shaping the conduct of families and individuals, we
conducted adocumentanalysis ofUKpolicies focussedupon the early
years, adolescence and older age. Document sourcing consisted of
four stages. First, we searched for documents using Google, limiting
the search to the UK with no time limits. Search terms included:
‘neurosciences’, ‘brain’, ‘plasticity’, ‘cognition’, ‘development’, ‘early
years’, ‘early intervention’, ‘adolescents’, ‘older adults’, ‘ageing’, and
‘memory’. We undertook a further search on the websites of the UK
governmentDepartmentsofHealth andofEducation (all publications
until 29 January 2014). Reports found were scanned for possible
relevance by searching for the term ‘brain’ or ‘neuro’; when these
terms were employed the documents were included in our sample.
Second,weused references topolicies inpreviouslypublishedarticles
on neuroscience and policy (Edwards et al., 2013; Macvarish et al.,
2013; Wastell and White, 2012). Third, we drew on our academic
and wider networks to ascertain whether any key documents were
missing from our sample. Finally, we used a snowballing strategy,
reading the policy documents and websites we found to see if these
referred to documents not yet included. In total, 84 documents (and 6
websites) were included in our sample. Of these, 58 explicitly
mentioned terms or concepts associated with the neurosciences, or
cited neuroscientiﬁc literature. The remaining 26 reports included
phrases that elsewherewere explicitly linkedwith theneurosciences,
e.g. “crucial foundation years” or “attachment” (and hence served as
materials for comparison), or alternatively were documents origi-
nating frommajor organisations (e.g. the Department for Education)
or which otherwise featured prominently in the search strategy.
These 26 reports do not feature explicitly in this paper, but theywere
included in our overall sample in order to give additional context to
our analysis. The documents were all available on the web, and they
were all published between 2000 and 2013. This sampling strategy
cannot claim to deﬁnitively include all relevant reports; yet, we
believe that the most salient materials were included.
Of the documents surveyed, one-quarter focused on children in
general and included references to or sections about teenagers. About
one-third focusedon the early years. One-ﬁfth each of the documents
concerned older adulthood or teenagers. The documents differed
extensively in terms of their emphases on the neurosciences. In about
20 reports theywere notmentioned at alle these reportsweremore
or less spread over the life-course, though proportionately fewer re-
ports focussing on older adulthood mentioned the neurosciences
explicitly. Slightly less than half of all the projectsmademoderate use
of the neurosciences, ranging from a few references, to reports in the
early years using the neurosciences frequently to justify the emphasis
on the ﬁrst three years in life. Approximately 20 reports used the
neurosciences extensively, and these reports could be found across
the life-course. (A table detailing all the included reports is available
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Upon reading the documents, Broer made detailed notes when a
reference was made to the neurosciences. Initial coding was ach-
ieved by copying and pasting selected sections into a separate
document. Both authors reviewed the selections, and had a series of
discussions within which a coding framework was developed. The
initial themes were: optimisation, vulnerability, opportunity, risk,
failing, protection/prevention, self-management/self-governance.
When analysing these themes further, and in light of the wider
literature, we realised that the themes/relevant data could largely
be seen as relating, in different ways, to responsibility. For example,
‘optimisation’ is related to a responsibility of (individual) citizens to
optimise their (individual) potential, and themes of ‘vulnerability’
are often addressed precisely when people are urged to be made
responsible for their own or others' vulnerability. We also consid-
ered that some of our initial themes made most ‘sense’ as grouped
into larger thematic clusters which containedmuch of the data that
was mapped to the original seven themes. These were, speciﬁcally:
optimisation, self-governance, and vulnerability. For example, the
data associated with the initial theme ‘failing’ were often also part
of the theme ‘optimisation’, and to a lesser but still signiﬁcant
extent the same goes for the data relating to the ‘risk’ theme.
In the next section, we examine each of the three themes in
turn. Our aim is to produce an interpretative sociological account of
how neuroscientiﬁc concepts and terms are enrolled in policy
documents to legitimate or argue for particular societal practices,
and hence conﬁgure and responsibilise citizens and social groups.
3. Results
3.1. Optimisation
By ‘optimisation’ we mean a focus on the practicalities of
maximising a broadly-understood human ‘potential’. This theme
was especially strong within documents regarding the early years.
Interventions posited for the early years include nurses visiting
(usually disadvantaged) families, reducing stress and improving the
health behaviours of pregnant women, and pre-school education.
In these (and some other) reports, an implicit or explicit imperative
is presented for individuals to meet their potential and to help
others achieve theirs.
In particular, suggestions are raised and claims made that chil-
dren should be brought up, educated and cared for in such a way
that they can meet their potential both during childhood and later
in life. These can be explicit even in the ways in which ‘early
intervention’ is deﬁned. For example, the so-called ‘Allen Report’
(speciﬁcally: Early Intervention: The Next Steps, 2011)e produced by
Graham Allen, MP and often taken by social scientists and other
scholars to be a hallmark in the UK early years debate (Macvarish
et al., 2014; Wastell and White, 2012) e deﬁnes early interven-
tion as:
the general approaches, and the speciﬁc policies and pro-
grammes, which help to give children aged 0e3 the social and
emotional bedrock they need to reach their full potential; and
to those which help older children become the good parents of
tomorrow. (p. xiii; emphasis added)
Aside from ‘potential’, discourses of optimisation were present
through the use of terms and notions like ‘life chances’, or via an
economic discourse of capital and investment. An idiom of opti-
misation especially regarding the early years has been identiﬁed by
other scholars (Nadesan, 2002; Wall, 2004, 2010); of particular
interest here, and which represents the focus hereafter in this
section, is how understandings and articulations of ‘optimisation’were produced through a neurobiological register.
This was most evident within Graham Allen's report, which
draws on neurologic terms and concepts as one important justiﬁ-
cation for early intervention. For instance:
An early, growth-promoting environment, with adequate nu-
trients, free of toxins, and ﬁlled with social interactions with an
attentive caregiver, prepares the architecture of the developing
brain to function optimally in a healthy environment. (Early
Intervention: The Next Steps, p. 14)
Such phraseology frames the soma as the appropriate target of
intervention (Pickersgill, 2009): it is the brain that should function
“optimally in a healthy environment”, rather than the developing
child per se.
Having work and raising happy families is considered important
across some of the reports pertaining to the early years. These pro-
social achievements - which seek to optimise citizens for a partic-
ular (economically productive) vision of society ewill, as the 2008
Early Intervention: Good Parents, Great Kids, Better Citizens report
puts it, help to counter the “intergenerational transmission of
disadvantage” (p. 9). This document was produced by The Centre
for Social Justice (a think-tank established by Conservative MP Ian
Duncan Smith) and The Smith Institute (a broadly left-wing think-
tank), with Allen as a co-author. Ultimately, this transmission is
presented as occurring through the brain. For example, a paragraph
on the process of growth of synapses in the early years ends: “The
whole process has the effect of making early learned behaviour
resistant to change.” (p. 58) Hence, disadvantage and a lack of
parenting skills inﬂuence a child negatively through impacting
synaptic development and consolidating problematic behaviour.
Countering the intergenerational transmission of disadvantage is
expected to lead to fewer costs to the state, since “[i]f left un-
checked, not only could we face a feral future on our streets but the
public policy consequences will be massive and will come with a
tax bill to bankrupt every taxpayer” (p. 21, 22).
This was not the only report mentioning ‘the taxpayer’, under-
scoring the orientation of such reports towards the optimisation of
society writ large, even as the reports focus on individuals and
families. A striking example of this collapsing together of optimised
brains, persons and societies, and the economic logic that un-
derpins this, is a further report by Graham Allen: Early Intervention:
Smart Investment (2011). This focuses on the ﬁnancial gains and
losses possibly associated with early intervention. Its cover features
images of two ‘types’ of brains: one, the brain of a “normal” child;
the other, the brain of one who has experienced “extreme neglect”
(p. fci; front cover). Alongside these are gold bars showing how
much each brain would ‘cost’ the taxpayer. Next to the ‘normal’
brain is a single bar: i.e., the cost incurred through early interven-
tion. Within the terms of the report, though, this ‘cost’ is really “the
most fundamental investment in the human capital of our country”
(p. 9). However, the ‘neglected’ brain is associated with a pile of
nine bars, labelled (e.g.) ‘teen pregnancy’, ‘failed relationships’, and
‘shorter life’. Such negative outcomes affect not only existing citi-
zens, but also have consequences for future generations; most
explicitly, through how people with ‘neglected’ brains will be less
able to raise happy families, thereby repeating “the cycle of
dysfunction” (p. 5) (see, relatedly, O'Conner and Joffe, 2013). Im-
plicit is the idea that these ‘social problems’ have measurable
ﬁnancial corollaries, blending together societal and monetary
‘costs’. Accordingly, the report contributes to a discourse of opti-
misation in terms not only of individual (proto-) citizens, but of
‘society’ more broadly (as a consequence of strategic state invest-
ment) and of an imagined future population.
In spite of the orientation towards themes of optimisation in a
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more critical towards this discourse e and deployed neurobiolog-
ical research as a means of problematizing it. For example, Early
Years Learning (a background brieﬁng for an inquiry into early years
education), argues that how the formation of synapses in the brain
“relates to later educational learning or to the acquisition of
knowledge and skills […] is unknown” (p. 3). It concludes: “Overall,
the research does not support the argument for a selective educa-
tional focus speciﬁcally on children's earliest years” (p. 4). Further,
“There is no convincing evidence that special enriching environ-
ments are advantageous to the development of the child” (p. 12).
However, this critique is grounded within a neurologic episte-
mology as opposed to an explicit political ideology, and hence
implicitly advocates for a particular mode of technocratic govern-
ing. In so doing, discourses of optimisation per se are not troubled:
the scepticism professed focussed on the evidentiary support of
current goals-not the goals per se.
A more overtly critical engagement with the political mobi-
lisation of neurobiology appears in the 2010 report, Issues in Earlier
Intervention: Identifying and Supporting Children with Additional
Needs. This was “commissioned by the Department for Children,
Schools and Families (DCSF) to provide a more nuanced under-
standing of concepts such as prevention and early intervention”
(among other things) (p. 8). It troubles both the use of neuroscience
in policy reports and the consequences of these, citing a
number of researchers and academics [who] have also been
critical of the notion of earlier intervention, for example on the
basis that it involves increased surveillance of families; […] or
that it places too much emphasis upon individual problems and
gives insufﬁcient attention to the social and economic condi-
tions that impact on children's lives (p. 15; references deleted).
Hence, this report seems to be somewhat wary of political
agendas around early intervention more broadly, thereby at least
raising the possibility for questioning the ideology underlying some
of the other reports concerned with the early years.
Nevertheless, most of the documents pertaining to the early
years convey, in more or less explicit ways, that ‘human potential’
both exists and can be optimised through particular policy levers.
This discourse is not only focused on individuals, but represents a
speciﬁc notion of society as well, and of relationships between
people. One aspect of this is that people should ideally be as least
dependent as possible on ‘the taxpayer’, which is related to a notion
of people being able to govern (i.e., to have responsibility for)
themselves. This is the second theme in our analysis.
3.2. Self-governance
Whilst discourses of optimisation were most strikingly evident
within policy documents pertaining to the early years, the theme of
‘self-governance’ ran across the different life stages considered in
this analysis. Data expressing this theme includes, especially, in-
stances where individuals are urged to take care of themselves, or
where (e.g.) professionals are enjoined to help people to take care
of themselves (i.e., to facilitate self-governance).
In the reports we inspected that took the early years as their
focus, for instance, important attributes for (future) citizens involve
a capacity to be responsible for themselves and their children, and
to personally manage life's challenges in order that they are not
dependent on others e and especially not ‘the taxpayer’. For
example, the aforementioned Early Intervention: The Next Steps
asserts that if children have an underdeveloped cortex they lack “an
‘emotional guardian’” (p. 17). Hence, the basis for self-governance is
framed as explicitly located within a child's brain. By nurturing andprotecting a developing brain, the child in turn will be protected
from being too easily swept away by challenges and adversities
later in life.
This is closely related to the notion of ‘resilience’, a term circu-
lating widely within UK policy discourse and attached to a variety
of ontological kinds (e.g. places, objects, communities, individual
psychology) where ‘threats’ are constructed and argued to be in
need of guarding against (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2013). The
concept of ‘resilience’ was often shaped through a neurobiological
register in the reports we inspected. In the 2012 Annual Report of
the Chief Medical Ofﬁcer, Our Children Deserve Better: Prevention
Days (2013), resilience is deﬁned as:
the term used to describe the relative resistance that can be
shown by the brain to psychosocial risk experiences. […] Put
simply, ‘it is the capacity to resist or bounce back from adver-
sity’. It is the ability to overcome stressful insults or to experi-
ence a relatively good outcome despite exposure to situations or
insults that create negative effects in others. (p. 38; footnotes
deleted)
Resilience, then, is about overcoming stressful events and
bouncing back from adversity e and, importantly for our analysis,
its most fundamental ontology seemed ascribed to the brain itself,
as vividly illustrated in a 2011 report from the Department of
Education:
Mentally tough individuals - those with a high ability to cope
with challenges and operate at peak performance levels - have a
greater volume of grey matter tissue in the right frontal lobe, an
area of the brain associated with strategic thinking and problem
solving, and the precuneus, involved in the sense of self and
one's capabilities. (Positive for Youth Discussion Paper: Adolescent
Brain Development, p. 5, 6)
Whilst this document does not directly infer causal relation-
ships between individuals' brains and traits, it does frame ‘mental
toughness’ as having cerebral underpinnings, and further presents
this quality as desirable. The later (2011) report Positive for Youth: A
New Approach to Cross-Government Policy for Young People Aged 13
to 19 (which is in part based on this discussion paper, and especially
the neurologic themes therein) likewise emphasises the related
qualities of resilience and mental toughness. It underscores the
value of promoting these in education practice and in youth work,
arguing that mental toughness largely determines the abilities of
individuals to “deal with challenge, stress and pressure” (p. 34). In
effect, a particular cerebral architecture, built in childhood through
parenting and education practices, is presented as being a platform
upon which good self-governance can be built.
The ideal of self-governance is also visible in how adults are
used as contrast points in reports on adolescents, where adult
brains are ‘fully matured’ and therefore capable of some of the
things that young people are said to struggle with. For example the
2007 Department for Education and Skills report, Supporting Par-
ents of Teenagers, argues:
These research ﬁndings suggest that changes in the teenage
brain result in a temporary, but necessary period of dis-
organisation. Fortunately, through the appropriate amount of
trial and error, most teenagers survive this period of confusion
and develop into adults with brains that can make well-
informed decisions, retrieve important information, plan
future activities and control strong emotions. (p. 34)
Hence, (“most”) adults e or, more speciﬁcally, their brains e are
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This way of seeing self-governance is closely related to the way
rational decision making is often conceptualised, and through
which certain cognitive processes such as making well-informed
decisions are idealised as being right and rational. As authors
have noted, the ideal in “discourses of adolescent brain develop-
ment” (Kelly, 2012: 944) is for adolescents to turn into, and hence
be compared to, responsible adults (and therefore good citizens)
who successfully engage in ‘rational’ decision making.
Self-governance is also a theme present in documents focussing
on older adults. The 2008 Foresight Mental Capital and Wellbeing
report argues, for example, that adults have personal responsibility
for health behaviour to “ensure cognitive vitality in later life” (p.
58). It asserts:
It is never too early to adopt a healthy and protective lifestyle e
the decline in the brain starts many years before old age. So a
key message is for individuals to take a long-term view and not
wait until older age before taking action. (p. 200)
In order to “offer protection of mental capital”, individuals
should, for instance, take regular exercise (p. 57). Accordingly, self-
governance e in the form of disciplining oneself to exercise, eat
healthily, and refrain from smoking e is called for in order to
protect our brains, ourselves, and, ultimately, our society, from the
diverse costs of cognitive decline and dementia. The report thus
links to wider societal discourses around neurological change (or
damage) (Pickersgill et al., in press), and within which “the ageing
process involves a socio-political imperative that we govern our-
selves and our bodies in healthful and responsible ways” (Williams
et al., 2012: 74; emphasis removed).
Moreover, dementia in particular is seen as a brain disease that
limits people's capacities to govern themselves. This is illustrated
clearly in the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics' 2009 report on De-
mentia: Ethical issues:
Much distress, for example, may be caused by disinhibited
behaviour on the part of a person with dementia [...] Growing
understanding of how such behaviour is linked with damage to
the mechanisms in the brain that usually enable people to keep
particular thoughts and emotions private will encourage more
appropriate responses to such behaviour and help reduce the
stress placed on carers. (p. 52; footnotes deleted)
Resonant of calls for ‘brain-based parenting’ (Hughes and Baylin,
2012), such urging of citizens to recalibrate their responses to in-
dividuals with dementia enjoins carers to reimagine themselves
and their responsibilities: a lack of self-governance (or “dis-
inhibited behaviour”) requires understanding and “appropriate
responses”, with an imaginary of the brain of individuals with de-
mentia used to promote these. In the Department of Health 2013
report on Dementia: A State of the Nation Report on Dementia Care
and Support in England, a neurobiological idiom was also used by a
person with dementia who wanted to be treated with respect:
“we're not mad; this is just something that has happened to a part
of my brain” (p. 47).
As we have seen, one important attribute of citizens that is
emphasised by the authors of a range of reports pertaining to the
early years, adolescence, and later life is that of self-governance.
Individuals who manifest this capacity are able to control strong
emotions, plan ahead, protect their mental capital, and be resilient
and mentally tough in the face of life's challenges. Where young
infants (and, to a lesser extent, adolescents) are not seen as able to
govern themselves, their caregivers are urged to self-govern in
ways that will ensure the development of a (often cerebral)platform from which children will eventually learn this skill.
Moreover, people are seen as primarily responsible for self-
governance in such a way as to reduce the chances of dementia
and ‘ensure’ cognitive vitality. In cases where dementia has already
occurred, carers are encouraged to govern their own affects and
cognitive responses.
While the aims and agents of governance are articulated slightly
differently depending on the temporal focus of the reports under
consideration, they act in concert to weave a narrative of subjects
who are closely governed across the life course - who can act
responsibly and are optimised for family and civic relationships in
the ways discussed in the previous sections. The emphasis of self-
governance e indeed, in some cases its ontology e is justiﬁed
and constructed in part through recourse to a neurobiological
imaginary (Bessant, 2008; Kelly, 2012; Netherland, 2003; Vrecko,
2010).
3.3. Vulnerability
If themes of ‘optimisation’ and ‘self-governance’ speak directly
to an overarching discourse of responsibility, the language of
‘vulnerability’ e which plays a key role in UK social policy (Brown,
2012) e contributes to this in more subtle ways. Whilst an idiom of
vulnerability might seem to denote ‘irresponsibility’, it simulta-
neously evokes responsibility by enjoining an awareness of one's
own, or others', vulnerability, and thereby presents citizens with
responsibilities for guarding against or reducing this (see for a
related argument: Biebricher, 2011). A variety of entities (cerebral
matter, individuals, families) were put forward as being in some
sense ‘vulnerable’ in the reports considered. The way vulnerability
is constructed as relating to neurobiology is our focus in the
remainder of this section.
In the aforementioned Dementia: Ethical Issues report, people
with dementia are described as “inherently vulnerable” (p. xxv),
including to abuse from carers, with “the direct cause of their
symptoms [being] the progressive damage to the brain” (p. xxi).
Whereas people with dementia are not often referred to explicitly
as vulnerable, when they are this is seen as an inherent and un-
changeable property. In contrast, in the early years vulnerability is
most often a future possibility that can be prevented with the right
interventions. Indeed, the professed goal of early intervention is
commonly to make children less vulnerable in later life, by acting
on their brain at a young age. The 2008 Foresight Mental Capital and
Wellbeing report (discussed above) states:
The mother's health during pregnancy (physical health, stress,
nutrition and substance use) and the quality of nurturing that
the infant and young child receives programme the brain
biology of the developing child, making the child more or less
vulnerable to stress, mental health disorders and physical dis-
eases later in life. (p. 63)
When considered in the broader context of early years reports,
such statements about vulnerability interact with the themes of
optimisation and self-governance explored above, producing a
discursive matrix within which particular kinds of infants are
conﬁgured. Such children have brains that, if not cared for correctly,
will result in adolescent and adult subjects who are confronted
with more unfavourable life conditions than others and who are
less able to cope with them (because of their improperly set cere-
bral foundations). Children are, in effect, vulnerable to not being
resilient.
Where the early years are sometimes described as a ‘window of
opportunity’ (to produce resilient subjects), the teenage years are
more likely to be depicted as ‘a window of vulnerability’ (a phrase
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windows in development is one of the most debated ideas from the
psychological sciences used in policies targeting the early years in
particular to convey a ‘now or never’ argument in terms of a
rationale for raising children ‘well’ (and intervening in their lives
when deemed necessary). Associated especially with the work of
John Bowlby, ([1969] 1999) and his theories of attachment e but
also related to the development of speciﬁc abilities like vision and
language (Marco et al., 2011) e policy engagement with critical
periods or ‘windows’ today includes interpretations of neurosci-
entiﬁc research. As the aforementioned Our Children Deserve Better:
Prevention Pays report puts it:
While it is still too early to translate neuroscience into policy
interventions, we are beginning to understand why adoles-
cents are particularly vulnerable to peer inﬂuences and why
there appears to be a ‘window of vulnerability’ to risky be-
haviours around ages 14 to 17 years, particularly in the
presence of peers. (p. 154; emphasis in original; footnotes
deleted)
Whereas neurobiology is introduced tentatively in this extract, the
temporal register invoked (i.e., “too early”) is suggestive of a science
that will, one day, be able to speak directly to the hopes and goals of
policymakers, and hence be more readily incorporable within
practice.
In some of the reports examined, adolescents are constructed as
citizens who should be responsible precisely for their vulnerability,
and for their lack of capacity to take full responsibility. Here,
themes of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘self-governance’ mix together to
enjoin the protection of one's brain e and, hence, of oneself.
Frequently encountered and often emphasised within policy doc-
uments relating to adolescence were concerns regarding under-
developed decision-making abilities about the consumption of
alcohol. Reﬂecting wider public concerns about teenagers, adoles-
cents were framed as more prone to take risks like drinking (too
much) alcohol - potentially leading to their brains being damaged
(especially areas associated with decision-making and long-term
memory). The solution seems to be for adolescents and others to
understand this situation so as to be able to act responsibly. For
example, the 2008 report for the Department for Children, Schools
and Families, Use of Alcohol Among Children and Young People,
argues:
It must be made clear that alcohol does have massively more
impact on the body of young people than it does on those of
adults and that the foundations of addiction are more easily laid
in the brains of young people than of adults. (p. 93)
Teenagers' parents too are urged to have increased under-
standing of (the neurobiological basis of) their children's’ behaviour
and therefore for example to have more patience. Supporting Par-
ents of Teenagers, produced in 2007 for the Department for Edu-
cation and Skills, is e as the name suggests e entirely focused on
what it means to be a parent of teenagers and how people can be
best supported in this role. Knowledge of brain development is
presented as a key mechanism through which this can be achieved.
The report gives a detailed description of neurochemical changes
and imbalances in the teenage brain, concluding that
it appears as though many of the difﬁculties associated with the
teenage years are related to the biochemical and structural
changes that take place during post-pubescent brain develop-
ment. However, these ﬁndings do not suggest that problematic
teenage behaviour is simply a result of ‘nature running its
course’ and nothing can be done to alter it. Rather, theneurological ﬁndings underscore the importance of ‘nurture’ in
determining adolescent outcomes, since learning experiences
govern the course of the synaptic pruning process. […] These
facts have widespread implications for educational and social
policies, including those that support positive parenting. (p. 35)
Hence, the report presents a broadly ‘environmental’
(“nurture”) narrative of human development that nevertheless
foregrounds the role of the brain. This enables the following
conclusion to be made: “parents play a particularly important role
during this time of child development and [ … ] quality parenting
counts” (p. 164).
The very existence of reports focussing solely and explicitly on
adolescents performs cultural work in producing this temporal
period as discreet and somehow special. In turn, they resonatewith
other constructions of a ‘neurological adolescent’ within science
and wider culture e even if teenagers themselves may be ambiv-
alent or agonistic to such explanatory models of their personhood
(Choudhury et al., 2012). Such “neural imaginings” (Buchbinder,
2014: 1) are also leveraged to argue for diminished, explicitly
criminal, responsibility in teenagers (Walsh, 2011).
In a different yet related way, the 2008 Youth Justice Board
report, A Literature Review into Children Abused and/or Neglected
Prior Custody, cites scholars who argue for the need to “re-invent [
… ] justice”, since “young offenders” who have experienced
maltreatment are “constitutionally more at risk of responding and
behaving maladaptively” (p. 44). ‘Constitutionally’ here includes
traumatic history and social experiences as well as the biological
impact that maltreatment has had. The authors cited in the report
furthermore wonder how the law could be fair to these young of-
fenders who behave maladaptively “through no fault of their own”
(p. 44). Understanding brain biology therefore (or, rather, under-
standing this way of understanding brain biology) can lead to pleas
for reduced culpability in court for different people. Such a cerebral
framing seeks to interfere with legal notions not only of adoles-
cence, but also of justice per se.
To summarise, in this section we have explored how a discourse
of vulnerability was one way through which the responsibilities of
citizens were construed. This discourse comes back in different
ways across the three life-course stages we have focused on.
Perhaps surprisingly (see O'Connor and Joffe, 2013), teenagers and
their brains are more likely to be explicitly framed as vulnerable
than infants. Vulnerability is related to the ‘risky’ behaviour of
teenagers but also to the idea that the risks that they take can have
more impact on their still developing brains. Whereas infants too
are sometimes described as vulnerable, vulnerability is for them
more often presented as a problem for the future that can be
mitigated against by early intervention; people with dementia, in
contrast, are less frequently constructed as vulnerable than ado-
lescents, but when they are, this vulnerability is ‘ﬁxed’ and intrinsic,
as opposed to something that might wax and wane through their
own agency.4. Conclusion
Through a documentary analysis of UK policy reports focused on
the early years, adolescence and older adulthood, we have analysed
how these employ neuroscientiﬁc terms and concepts, and what
roles such notions play in (re)deﬁning citizen responsibilities. Re-
sponsibility was largely produced in three different but intersecting
ways: through a focus on optimisation, on self-governance, and on
vulnerability. Responsibilities are cast in terms of responsibilities to
the self, as well as to others, with the aim of enhancing individuals
and communities. Especially in policies focused on the early years,
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intervening in the brain through family and social life. Reports
speak of and directly to ‘the taxpayer’, thereby producing and
enrolling a particular sociotechnical imaginary (Jasanoff and Kim,
2009; Pickersgill, 2011; Stephens et al., 2013) to construct and
substantiate a vision of society and the technical processes gov-
erning it: one within which ﬂows of capital can be anticipated,
interpreted and accounted for in terms of their relation to certain
kinds of individuals and their amalgamated cost to the state and the
individuals (i.e., ‘the taxpayers’) who ﬁnance it. Hence, the reports
under consideration construct images of society (and, of course, of
the body) through which intervention on the brain ‘makes sense’.
While neurosciencemay be leveraged by policymakers inways that
(potentially) reduce the target of their intervention to the soma,
however, they do so in order to expand the outcome of the inter-
vention to include society writ large.
Overall, the neurologic narratives we describe and the functions
they perform e especially regarding the import of relational forms
of responsibility e accord with those that Rose (1998) has ascribed
to the psy-sciences. These, he argues, represent an “individualizing
technology” that “enable(s) one to construe a form of family life,
education, or production that simultaneously maximizes the ca-
pacities of individuals, their personal contentment, and the efﬁ-
ciency of the institution” (Rose, 1998: 114). Rose has more recently
suggested that the neurosciences are beginning to occupy some of
the discursive space previously occupied by the psy-sciences (Rose,
2008; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013). This indeed seems to be the case
in many of the documents we inspected. Reports discussing policy
across the life course ascribe speciﬁc social problems to the func-
tioning of brains, yet the solution that they plea for is often a
relational one, where parents have a more loving relationship with
their children and understand their teenagers better, and where
people care for and understand the behaviour of those with de-
mentia. Through our analysis, inspired by the thinking of theorists
such as Foucault and Rose, we have been able to show not just the
different and sometimes contrasting ways in which the neurosci-
ences are employed in British social policy, but also how re-
sponsibility is a key theme in these policies (even as it comes to
take diverse forms). Importantly, this is not solely a responsibility
focused on individual self-care, but is also a responsibility often
framed in terms of relationships and the degree to which citizens
can help others become more responsible (nuancing, therefore,
claims that the use of neurosciences for policies lead to a greater
individual responsibility; e.g. (Wall, 2004).
The paper also adds further empirical detail to social scientiﬁc
accounts of neuroscience and society (e.g. Bessant, 2008; Br€oer and
Heerings, 2013; Choudhury et al., 2012; Kelly, 2012; Nadesan, 2002;
Pickersgill, 2013, 2014; Pickersgill et al., in Press; Williams et al.,
2012). In particular, it extends scholarship on the early years that
has pointed to the dominance of individual optimisation in policy
and other discourses around infanthood, and the contribution that
a neurobiological register makes to these (Nadesan, 2002; O'Conner
and Joffe, 2013; Wall, 2004, 2010; Wastell and White, 2012). Ana-
lyses of early years policies have focused largely on the most visible
reports (e.g. those by Graham Allen), which indeed seem to illus-
trate the message of individual optimisation in the most expressive
ways. However, we have shown that not all reports present this
speciﬁc message; importantly, some documents even explicitly
critique such a discourse - either by questioning the neurobiolog-
ical evidence or by questioning its underlying ideology. This ﬁnding
renders problematic any assumptions about the force of neurobi-
ology within policy per se, and is suggestive of the need for further
nuanced attention to the place, role and impact of neuroscientiﬁc
terms and concepts in different policy domains.
Our analysis thus indicates the import of neuroscience to UKsocial policies, whilst simultaneously suggesting caveats both for
generalising out from particular reports and policy domains, and
for assuming that broader societal implications emerge from these.
For one, the fact that neuroscientiﬁc terms and concepts exist
within policy reports does not necessarily imply fundamentally new
kinds of social praxis, given the correspondence of the leveraging of
neuroscience in policy with the widespread deployment of psy-
chological knowledge in the twentieth century (even if ontologies
of self and society are themselves partly recast within policy doc-
uments). Further, our ﬁndings demonstrate why it remains
important to be mindful both of the limits to which a neurobio-
logical idiom is deployed in policy settings (and elsewhere), and of
the extent to which critical discourses may proliferate even within
the terrain where the terms and concepts of the neurosciences
occupy space (see for similar arguments: Br€oer and Heerings, 2013;
O'Connor and Joffe, 2013; Pickersgill, Martin and Cunningham-
Burley, in press; Whiteley, 2012). In so doing, sociological studies
can contribute to increased empirical speciﬁcity concerning the
salience of neuroscientiﬁc knowledge whilst refusing to reproduce
any notion that the neurosciences have a uniformly dominant role
(to play) in contemporary policy and everyday life.
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